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1. Introduction
In a recent article (‘The Continuum: Russell’s Moment of
Candour’), Christopher Ormell argues against the traditional math-
ematical view that the real numbers form an uncountably inﬁnite
set.1 He rejects the conclusion of Cantor’s diagonal argument for
the higher, non-denumerable inﬁnity of the real numbers. He does
so on the basis that the classical conception of a real number is mys-
terious, ineffable, and epistemically suspect. Instead, he urges that
mathematics should admit only ‘well-deﬁned’ real numbers as
proper objects of study. In practice, this means excluding as inadmis-
sible all those real numbers whose decimal expansions cannot be
calculated in as much detail as one would like by some rule.2
The aim of this discussion note is to explain why Ormell’s argu-
ments should not convince philosophers that classical mathematics
is wrong about the continuum. All that Ormell manages to show is
that once the concept of a real number is restricted to include only
those deﬁnable (and hence constructively acceptable), the set of
such real numbers is denumerable (i.e., countably inﬁnite).
‘Deﬁnability’ seems to be an intuitive informal notion, suggesting
1 C. Ormell, ‘The Continuum: Russell’s Moment of Candour’,
Philosophy 81, No. 4, (October 2006), 659–668.
2 Ormell, ibid, 663. A number is ‘well-behaved’ just in case it ‘proceeds
according to a law which enables us to calculate as many terms as we please’.
Numbers are not well-behaved just in case (in writing out their decimal
expansions) ‘we can’t write down their successive digits by following a
rule of any sort’. In contemporary terms, well-behaved numbers are
computable by some algorithm. Ormell says mathematics should admit
only ‘well-deﬁned’ numbers and considers ‘well-behaved’ numbers to be
‘extremely well-deﬁned’.
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that a number is deﬁnable just in case we can write something down
that uniquely speciﬁes that number. Thus, a number could be deﬁn-
able simply because we can write down all of the digits in its decimal
expansion. However, the vast majority of numbers have inﬁnite, non-
repeating decimal sequences. The only way that a ﬁnite mind can
tame such an inﬁnite sequence is by conceiving of it as governed by
a rule. No one disputes that when the real numbers are restricted to
deﬁnable numbers, there are only countably many.3 The core philo-
sophical issue concerns whether all numbers must be deﬁnable.
In what follows, it will be useful to bear in mind the dialectic
between constructivists and classical mathematicians. Classical math-
ematicians happily accept the inference:
(1) There are uncountably many real numbers.
(2) There are at most countably many deﬁnable numbers.
(3) Therefore, not all numbers are deﬁnable.4
Constructivists reject step (3) of the argument, because they hold that
properly understood, all real numbers are deﬁnable. The general
inference (from (1) and (2) to (3)) is valid. Furthermore, no one dis-
putes (2). Thus, in order to reject the argument, constructivists have
to reject premise (1). The grounds for rejecting (1) are that, once it is
accepted that all numbers are deﬁnable, there can only be countably
many reals.5
We contend, however, that the restriction of real numbers to those
constructively deﬁnable is based on an unacceptable idealism, which
regards the existence of numbers as dependent on some act of human
minds. Only from this idealist perspective does it make sense to doubt
3 Indeed, since deﬁnable numbers must be deﬁned using countably
many symbols, the countability of deﬁnable numbers follows immediately.
4 One could further infer from (3) using classical logic that
(4) There exist indefinable real numbers.
Some constructivists would also reject the inference to step (4) from (3),
because the transition
:8xFx! 9x:Fx
is not valid in intuitionist logic. However, even constructivists who main-
tain classical logic will want to reject the argument on the basis of step (3).
5 One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens tollens. That is,
classical mathematicians argue that because reals are uncountable (as estab-
lished by the diagonal argument), there must be indeﬁnables. The construc-
tivists argue that because there could not be indeﬁnable numbers (given their
philosophical conception of numbers), therefore the reals are countable.
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that the indeﬁnable real numbers are proper objects of mathematical
study. This idealist tendency is reﬂected in Wittgenstein’s criticism
of Cantor’s diagonal argument, which is one of the original sources
(aside from Brouwer) of the constructivist view Ormell advances.
We further suggest that such idealism rests on a major mistake: that
of mistaking epistemic limitations for metaphysical deﬁciencies.6
But, there are more things than are dreamt of in constructivist philos-
ophy. To demand that what could be in theworld is restricted towhat
we can dream of is to take amegalomaniacally anthropocentric view of
human capacity in relation to the world.
2. Of Rules and Reals
Recall that Cantor reasoned as follows. If the real numbers were
merely countably inﬁnite, then it would be possible to enumerate
them. However, if we draw up a list of reals (supposing we can do
so) and pair each number of the list with a natural number, we
immediately see that the list is incomplete. For we can always generate
a real number not in the list by applying the diagonal procedure. For
convenience we attempt to list just the real numbers between 0 and 1,
and we use the decimal representations of real numbers. Part of our
list might look like this:
Real numbers Natural numbers
0.a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6. . . 1
0.b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6. . . 2
0.c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6. . . 3
0.d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6. . . 4
0.e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6. . . 5
0.f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6. . . 6
. . . and so on.
To construct a number not on the list, we let d ¼ 0.d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6. . ..,
where each di is different from the nth number in the nth row in our
list. In each case, a number generated by the diagonal procedure is
constructively well-deﬁned, since it is given by a rule that we can
readily specify and apply. Thus far, Cantor’s diagonal argument is
constructively impeccable. However, Cantor went on to suggest
that, despite our not being able to list ‘all the reals’, we can still
6 On the charge of idealism leading philosophers astray when contem-
plating the continuum, see J. Franklin, ‘Achievements and fallacies in
Hume’s account of inﬁnite divisibility’, Hume Studies 20 (1994), 85–101.
119
On the Reality of the Continuum
think of the reals as a set with a deﬁnite size (@1 ), a size greater than
the number of natural numbers (@0).
Many constructivists object to Cantor’s conclusion at this point
on the grounds that it seems to involve treating the real numbers
as though they could form a completed whole.7 In particular, to
give the totality of real numbers a deﬁnite cardinal number presup-
poses that the collection can be treated as a mathematical object
in the same way that the ﬁnite numbers can. Indeed, this aspect
of Cantor’s approach is somewhat perversely called ‘ﬁnitism’ by
Hallett [1984], who wishes to make the point that Cantor proposed
to treat the inﬁnite numbers as complete, deﬁnite, manipulable and
susceptible to mathematical operations in roughly the same way as
the ﬁnite numbers.8 But for constructivists to treat the inﬁnite on
par with the ﬁnite is to misconceive the nature of the former. As
Dummett explains,
From an intuitionistic standpoint, the platonistic conception is
the result of blatantly transferring, from the ﬁnite case to the inﬁ-
nite one, a picture appropriate only to the former. In making this
transference, the platonist destroys the whole essence of inﬁnity,
which lies in the conception of a structure which is always in
growth, precisely because the process of construction is never
completed.9
However, it is clear this objection is far too fundamental to be the
reason why constructivists such as Ormell baulk at the diagonal argu-
ment. If the problem is that it is illegitimate to gather the reals into a
whole, because this operation destroys the potentially inﬁnite nature
of the reals, then this objection must apply also to the treatment of
the natural numbers as a whole. Ormell appears sympathetic to this
objection. He countenances countably inﬁnite classes of numbers,
but stops short of talking of countably inﬁnite sets. However, strate-
gically, the objection is a non-starter. If the goal is to convince classi-
cal mathematicians that Cantor’s diagonal argument is wrong, it
would not be wise to start by arguing for ﬁnitism out of metaphysical
conviction.
7 The objection is common to Peirce, Brouwer, and Wittgenstein in
their reactions to Cantor’s argument.
8 M. Hallett, Cantorian Set Theory and Limitation of Size (Oxford:
Oxford Logic Guides, 1994), 7.
9 M. Dummett, Elements of Intuitionism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977), 57. (Ormell makes it clear that he is not an intuitionist, but as with
Wittgenstein, he does share some of the early Brouwer’s views.)
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Ormell’s stated objection to the diagonal argument is different
from the ﬁnitist scruples mentioned above. Ormell is concerned
that the diagonal procedure will not generate all the reals needed to
get an uncountably inﬁnite set. There are only countably many
reals generated by the diagonal procedure. The number of reals on
the original list is also countable. Moreover, the union of countably
many countably inﬁnite sets is still countable.10 So merely adding
the diagonal numbers to our list will not yield the uncountably inﬁ-
nite set of real numbers. To attain that result, we must add the
indeﬁnables.
What reason is there to believe in the existence of indeﬁnables?
Admittedly, the indeﬁnables can seem a bit like the ‘dark matter’ of
mathematics. Indeﬁnables are needed to make the classical theory
of the continuum come out right. The classical theory says there
are 2@0 many real numbers between 0 and 1, whereas each ‘known’
family of reals has at most @0 members. In the same way, physicists
posit ‘dark matter’ in order to explain why so much less mass of
matter in the universe is observed than is predicted by their best cos-
mological theory. ‘Darkmatter’ cannot be detected in the sameway as
luminous matter, so the evidence for it is indirect. Similarly, there is
no direct experiential evidence for the indeﬁnables. Ormell says the
indeﬁnables are ‘invisible, unproducable, and unbelievable’.11 Next
Ormell might be expected to complain that the objects of mathemat-
ical analysis do not smell. This is a respect in which his empiricist
idealism goes too far.12
More soberly, Ormell’s main objection is that the idea of indeﬁn-
ables ‘cannot survive the simple challenge, ‘Well, let’s examine
one!”.13 Although we cannot, of course, deﬁne an indeﬁnable, we
can describe how a family of such indeﬁnables could be generated.
A common way of doing so is to consider the number that might be
produced by a particular fair coin tossing process. Every number
10 This result is sometimes proved using the Axiom of Choice which is
not constructively acceptable, but it can be proved using countable choice.
11 Ormell, ibid, p. 667.
12 To lay our cards on the table, we are sympathetic to empiricism, but
only of a realist (Aristotelian) variety. We hold that some very basic math-
ematical properties such as symmetry and ratios may be perceptible. We
think that there could be real physical continuawith the structure of the con-
tinuum, although it is an open question. We are sympathetic to the
‘Aristotelian account’ outlined in D. Gillies, ‘An Empiricist Philosophy of
Mathematics and its Implications for the History of Mathematics’, The
Growth of Mathematical Knowledge, E. Grosz and H. Breger, (eds.), 46–51.
13 Ormell, ibid, p. 664.
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can be represented in binary notation as a string of 0s and 1s. We can
allow ‘1’ to correspond to a ‘heads’ result and ‘0’ to correspond to a
‘tails’ result in coin tossing. Suppose that we start some particular
process (which we can date and locate) and obtain the following
initial digits for a number R*:
R ¼ 0:111111001001001111100100111 . . .
What we have written down is not the number R*, but an initial
segment of the number R* and many other numbers sharing the
same initial segment. If (let’s say) the process generating R*
is random and never ending, then R* is itself indeﬁnable.
There are limitations on our knowledge about R*. We cannot ﬁnd
out as much as we like. We cannot predict, for example, what the
billionth digit in R* is, unless, we are lucky enough to live to see
the result. Nonetheless, it does seem that we can—in a manner of
speaking—examine R* even if only as a member of an equivalence
class.
Ormell’s view must be that we do not really know which object R*
is, since we cannot single it out directly in isolation. That is, we refer
to R*, but only as a member of a totality of which it is a part. This
appears to be an instance of impredicative deﬁnition. Constructivists
ﬁnd impredicative deﬁnitions objectionable, and claim that they are
viciously circular. Frank Ramsey pointed out that impredicative deﬁ-
nitions can be perfectly acceptable. We can deﬁne a certain man as
‘the tallest member of his class’, and there is nothing amiss with
this impredicative deﬁnition. It is not obvious that impredicative
deﬁnitions should not be acceptable when dealing with inﬁnite total-
ities too.14
Ormell is right about one point, however. It is impossible to
single out R* in isolation. There is no rule that ﬁts R*. Even if
R* exhibited some regularity for a while, there would be no guaran-
tee that it would continue. It might repeat its initial segment a
billion times before throwing up a different segment and then
resume a repetition of its initial segment ad inﬁnitum. Given the
possibility of a number’s divergence from expectations at some
further point given an initial segment of the number’s decimal
expansion, it is impossible to know exactly which real number we
are considering in the absence of a complete speciﬁcation (or
14 M. Potter, Set Theory and its Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 137. On the acceptability of impredicative deﬁnitions for
classes, see M. Giaquinto, The Search for Certainty, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 107.
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deﬁnition) of that number.15 Such a speciﬁcation would consist
either in an exact name for the object (as is easily provided for
rational numbers, integers, special numbers like p and e, and
some others) or else in the speciﬁcation of a rule for calculating
each successive digit in the decimal expansion of the number.16 If
we do not know exactly which number we are dealing with, then
it will be difﬁcult to say anything precise about it. The constructi-
vist conception of mathematics prohibits acceptance of such
unknown and perhaps unknowable entities. For example, Ormell
says ‘random sequences, if they exist out there, are not cashable as
‘mathematical objects’. How could they be? Mathematics is the
study of the implications of well-deﬁned formal concepts’.17
3. Idealism and Realism
We think that the philosophical perspective motivating the construc-
tivist restriction on the reals is fallacious. Once the rhetorical
ﬂourishes are expunged, the constructivist position amounts to the
following:
Indeﬁnable real numbers cannot exist, because they are not deﬁ-
nitely conceivable. They are not surveyable and calculable by
ﬁnite human minds.
Thus laid bare, this style of reasoning is fallacious, because we may
lack an ability to deﬁnitely conceive of an entity x and yet it may
still be the case that x is nonetheless real and, a fortiori, possible.
European naturalists could not deﬁnitely conceive that there could
be such a mammal as the platypus, and yet platypuses did exist
while undiscovered by the European imagination.
Have we been unfair to constructivists? To be sure, constructivists
do not deny the existence of indeﬁnable reals outright. They deny the
legitimacy or admissibility of such objects for mathematical study. It
would clearly be a fallacy to move from the fact that we cannot
deﬁne a number to the conclusion that such a number does not
15 This kind of reasoning is very close to L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Grammar, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 477. Here Wittgenstein states that
all we have done is marked out an interval rather than closed in on a particu-
lar real number.
16 Cantor’s diagonal technique is one such rule for constructing a well-
deﬁned real number.
17 Ormell, ibid, p. 664.
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exist. Rather, applying Occam’s Razor, constructivists say that such
indeﬁnables should not ﬁgure in a mathematical theory. Taking a
derogatory view of metaphysics and religion, constructivists are
likely to suggest that indeﬁnables may ﬁgure in these ﬁelds of
study.18 Perhaps the requirement for ‘admission’ into non-mathematical
ﬁelds of study is lower than the standard required for admission into
mathematics!
But, wait, what is this talk of ‘admissibility’ really? The concepts of
admissibility and legitimacy are allied to the notions of human auth-
ority and law. From the realist standpoint, numbers and other real
things do not need admitting or legitimating by humans to come
into existence. Furthermore, real objects are always legitimate
objects of study in the sciences, even if they are not fully understood
or known.
The following analogy will convey the realist assessment of the
debate between constructivists and realists. Consider a ﬁeld like
astronomy, about which most people are realists. That is, they hold
planets and stars really exist, and do so independently of what
human beings think about them. Imagine some radical astronomers
deciding that planets outside our solar system were ‘inadmissible’,
because they could not be observed by current telescopes in such a
way as to produce images of sufﬁciently high resolution. Suppose
that a dispute then arises between the traditional and radical
astronomers concerning the number of planets in the universe.
The traditional astronomers claim that there are far more planets in
the universe than nine, because they count the planets that are,
from the radical perspective, ‘inadmissible’.19 From a realist perspec-
tive, this is what the debate between constructivist and realists looks
like.
From the constructivist perspective, of course, the story is not apt.
Constructivists do not think that numbers have an existence indepen-
dent of the minds that perceive them, in the way that planets exist
independently of human observers. To them, the realist fallacy is to
assume that mathematical theorems describe some fantastic land-
scape. AsWittgenstein put it in his critique of the diagonal argument,
The dangerous, deceptive thing about the idea: “The real
numbers cannot be arranged in a series”, or again “The set. . .is
18 Cf. N.Wildberger, ‘Set Theory: Should You Believe?’, http://web.
maths.unsw.edu.au/~norman/papers/SetTheory.pdf, April 2006.
19 We prescind from the current debate over whether there are really
eight or nine planets.
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not denumerable” is that it makes the determination of a
concept—concept formation—look like a fact of nature.20
For constructivists, numbersmust be regarded as humanmental con-
structions. The motivation for so regarding them is to enable and
ensure perfect knowledge of the numbers. According to one version
of the verum-factum principle, we understand best what we ourselves
produce. If all numbers are constructed by us, then presumably we
will know all of their properties. Such a philosophical view cannot
tolerate indeﬁnables, the properties of which are not completely
known. Realism, on the contrary, always brings with it the possibility
of scepticism and incomplete knowledge.
Constructivists are sceptical about the existence of indeﬁnable real
numbers. In a revealing footnote, Ormell says:
They [indeﬁnable real numbers] never feature in mathematical
seminars, lectures, or conferences: they are never seen in math-
ematical textbooks or monographs. Their only role, it appears,
is as fantasy objects which, it is hoped, might nominally save
the ofﬁcial interpretation of the Diagonal Argument.21
Consequently, since we cannot know these numbers intimately, we
should—by constructivists’ lights—assume that they do not exist,
or more cautiously, that they are ‘inadmissible’.
Of course it is patently untrue that the indeﬁnable real numbers
never ﬁgure in mathematical seminars. What is true is that they do
so as ensemble-players, as members of the continuum, rather than
as individual lead actors (as independently speciﬁed decimals).
Moreover, it is patently untrue that the only role of the indeﬁnables
is to save the diagonal argument. Without the indeﬁnable reals, we
do not have a complete ﬁeld of real numbers. That is, we need such
indeﬁnables to ‘ﬁll in the gaps’ between the points in the sparse con-
structive continuum. The important least upper bound property of
continuous intervals requires indeﬁnable reals, as does the seemingly
obvious Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT). IVT simply says that if
we have a function f(x) that is continuous over the interval [a,b], and
the value of the function at one endpoint is negative and at the other
endpoint is positive (e.g. f(b) . 0 and f(a) , 0), then the function
must be equal to zero at some point c intermediate between a and b
20 L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed.
G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and GEM Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell,
1978), §19, .131.
21 Ormell, ibid, p. 664 fn. 9.
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(i.e. f(c) ¼ 0 for some c in (a, b)). The analysis that results without
these properties is difﬁcult and different.22
4. Uncomputable reals
Liberal constructivism ought to allow the existence of uncomputable
reals. It is not clear whether Ormell allows for such reals, because he
does not discuss the distinction between computability and deﬁnabil-
ity. The ‘lawless decimals’ he discusses are both indeﬁnable and
uncomputable. However, modern complexity theory allows for
uncomputable, deﬁnable reals. Chaitin’s construction (V) is a
recipe for deﬁning a number (called Chaitin’s constant VL) that
gives the probability that a randomly chosen program in a given
language L will halt.23 Chaitin’s construction makes use of the fact
that the halting problem—the problem of deciding whether an arbi-
trary programme in a language will terminate or continue endlessly—
is undecidable (that is, there is no algorithm to compute the answer)
for all programmes. The computation of Chaitin’s constant would
require solving the halting problem, which is impossible. So in
each case – in each language L - Chaitin’s constant is uncomputable.
Nonetheless, Chaitin’s constant is a particular probability, that is, a
proportion in a set, a particular real number between 0 and 1. It
appears to be well-deﬁned in the sense demanded by Ormell, of
being fully describable in a language. It is possible to approximately
calculate Chaitin’s number in each case. So there is nothing ineffable
or indeﬁnable about such a number. The existence of uncomputable
deﬁnable reals suggests the untenability of strict constructivism (‘the
algorithmic standpoint’), which admits as legitimate mathematical
entities only those entities which can be computed by an algorithm.
One of the most promising interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philos-
ophy of mathematics suggests thatWittgenstein was a strict construc-
tivist.24 So much the worse for Wittgenstein and his friends in
mathematics.
22 Eric Schechter, ‘Constructivism is Difﬁcult’, The American
Mathematical Monthly, 108, No. 1, January 2001, 50–54.
23 Gregory Chaitin, ‘The limits of reason’, Scientiﬁc American 294, No.
3 (March, 2006), 74–81.
24 On the interpretation ofWittgenstein as a proponent of ‘the algorith-
mic standpoint’, see M. Marion,Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Foundations
of Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
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5. Conclusion
Thus, all that Ormell’s discussion establishes is that the constructively
acceptable real numbers (the deﬁnable reals) are countably inﬁnite.
This result has been known for a long time, so the primary interest
in Ormell’s discussion lies in his attempt to raise sceptical doubts
about the existence of indeﬁnable and random real numbers.
However, as we have shown, his doubts about indeﬁnables stem
from an underlying empiricist idealism about the numbers that we
ﬁnd fallacious. Such idealism rests on the old Berkeleyan error: esse
est percipi. We think that such idealism is no more applicable to the
numbers than it is to tables and chairs. From a realist perspective, a
lack of complete knowledge of the properties of numbers does not
signal a lack of real existence.
Classical mathematics is doubtless committed to a whole hierarchy
of inﬁnities. Working mathematicians in the areas of set theory,
analysis, and topology, are generally happy with this state of affairs.
‘No one shall drive us out of the paradise which Cantor has
created’, Hilbert famously proclaimed at a mathematical congress
in 1925.25 Wittgenstein replied that Cantorian mathematics was not
a paradise, but a joke.26 We have argued that there is a philosophical
confusion underlying the constructivist position: the conﬂation of
what is real with what is epistemically conceivable. If this is right,
then the joke is on Wittgenstein and his followers. The ‘real’ real
numbers remain uncountably inﬁnite.
University of New South Wales
25 D. Hilbert, ‘U¨ber das Unendliche’, translated by E. Putnam and
G.J. Massey as ‘On the Inﬁnite’ in H. Putnam and P. Benacerraf, eds.,
Philosophy of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 191.
26 L. Wittgenstein, op.cit., V. 7, p. 264.
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